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I. INTRODUCTION

The lone scientist, toiling away over a Bunsen burner at midnight or
huddled in the corner of his garage with a few tools, has long held a
place in the American psyche. As tempting as this noble image is, the
truth is often much more mundane. Scientists typically work in groups,
with ideas flowing among members of the group in an often
∗Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. J.D., 2006, University of
Michigan Law School; Ph.D., 2003, University of Virginia, Department of Microbiology. This
Article is based upon a talk given at the 2015 Akron Law David and Ann Brennan IP Scholars
Forum. Many thanks to its participants for discussion and comments.
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unaccounted for manner, each idea building on the one before. Thus,
inventions often have multiple inventors, each responsible for a minor
aspect of the final invention.
This system of invention is the same model used in the laboratories
of research universities, colleges, and non-profit research institutions 1
across the country. A faculty member, called a Principal Investigator
(PI), leads a research team composed of a mix of research scientists,
post-doctoral fellows, graduate students, and technicians. These research
teams are responsible for thousands of new inventions across the country
each year. In order to commercialize these inventions, universities often
work with commercial entities to provide a means for the further
development of the university inventions in a process called technology
transfer. 2
Technology transfer is a complicated dance involving numerous
players and varied influences. Many universities have created
technology-transfer offices (TTOs) tasked with choreographing and
expediting this process. During the last three decades, technology
transfer has become an economic powerhouse, and universities have
become essential partners with industry, supplying innovative ideas and
groundbreaking concepts—and often, patented inventions. 3 Technology
transfer from 191 surveyed institutions produced 2.5 billion dollars in
royalties from licensing academic research innovations in 2008, likely
representing 50 to 70 billion dollars in sales of commercialized
products. 4
One of the most understudied aspects of the technology-transfer
system is the interrelationship between the various inventors named on a
patent application resulting from research conducted in these multiplayer laboratories. In a previous paper, I discussed the negotiation
power imbalance that exists between faculty and non-faculty inventors
as a factor explaining why non-faculty inventors are not invested in the
1. For brevity, “university” as used in the remainder of this Article will include research
colleges and non-profit research institutions.
2. For the purposes of this Article, “technology transfer” is the process by which
innovations from university researchers are licensed or otherwise conveyed to entities that will
eventually commercialize the innovation. The Association of University Technology Managers
defines technology transfer as: “Technology transfer is the process of developing and
commercializing scientific findings and fundamental discoveries into relevant applications.” ASS’N
OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY: FY2008 7 (Rich Kordal et
al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter AUTM FY2008].
3. Jerry G. Thursby et al., Objectives, Characteristics and Outcomes of University
Licensing: A Survey of Major U.S. Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 59, 59 (2001) [hereinafter
Thursby, Objectives].
4. See AUTM FY2008, supra note 2, at 3, 8.
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technology-transfer system. 5 That same negotiation power imbalance
directly impacts agreements between faculty and non-faculty joint
inventors as to how to divide patent royalties between them. One such
royalty sharing agreement recently led to a lawsuit by a former Harvard
graduate student based on accusations of fraud and coercion and well
illustrates many of the problems. 6
In June 2013, Dr. Mark Charest, a chemistry PhD student who
graduated from Harvard in 2004, sued the university along with Andrew
Myers, his PhD advisor. 7 The lawsuit arose due to the royalties
associated with a patent covering a new synthetic method for producing
6-deoxytetracycline antibiotics.8 This method became the basis for
Charest’s dissertation. 9 Additionally, in 2005 the Myers Lab published a
paper in Science that described the method. 10 Charest was the first
author listed on the paper. 11
From those humble research lab inventions, the method became
monetarily valuable. 12 As with all such research inventions, the method
was assigned to the sponsoring university, in this case, Harvard. 13 From
there, Harvard’s Office of Technology Development (OTD) patented the
method and sought to license it. 14 A company, Tetraphase
Pharmaceuticals, was started to commercialize the work by licensing the
tetracycline patent from the university. 15
The distribution of royalties from the Tetraphase license led to the
current dispute. 16 Harvard’s policy requires the university to distribute
royalties equally among all of the inventors on a patent unless the
inventors agree to a different distribution. 17 Harvard’s OTD asked
Charest and his former labmates to voluntarily accept a distribution of
50% to Myers, 15% to Charest, 15% to Dionicio Siegel, 15% to
Christian Lerner, and 5% to Jason Brubaker (the five co-authors of the

5. See generally Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Beyond Einstein and Edison: Claiming Space for
Non-Faculty Inventors in Technology Transfer, 47 IND. L. REV. 645 (2014).
6. See generally Complaint, Charest v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. & Andrew G.
Myers, 2016 WL 614368 (D. Mass. Feb. 16, 2016) (No. 1:13-cv-11556).
7. Id. at 1-4.
8. Id. at 4-5.
9. Id. at 5.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id. at 5.
12. Id. at 7.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Id. at 5-7.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Id. at 8-9.
17. Id. at 8.
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paper) rather than an equal split of 20% each. 18 The four non-faculty coauthors did not believe this to be an equitable split and agreed amongst
themselves to a distribution of 18.75% to Charest, 11.25% to Siegel,
10% to Lerner, and 10% to Brubaker. 19 Myers refused to participate in
the royalty negotiation and maintained that his 50% share was not open
for discussion. 20
Charest initially refused to accept the unequal distribution of the
royalties. 21 When he began discussions with Harvard’s OTD, Charest
claimed that Harvard threatened to directly cut Charest’s share of the
royalties or to shift the distribution of licensing payments to a second
patent on which Charest was not listed as an inventor.22 In addition,
Myers pressured Charest to accept the royalty distribution, using advice
such as “tread lightly,” “be careful,” and “think about [your] career.” 23
In light of the pressure from Harvard and his PhD advisor, Charest
signed an agreement to accept 18.75% of the royalties for the first
patent. 24 The second patent never materialized, and Charest asserted in
his complaint his belief that it was a ruse fabricated to force his hand to
volunteer to let Myers get a 50% cut of the royalties. 25 Additionally,
Myers refused to serve as a reference when Charest applied for a
position after graduate school, going so far as to not return phone calls
when a potential employer directly contacted Myers regarding Charest.26
The Charest case highlights important issues in royalty sharing
agreements. First, faculty and students are likely to value their own
individual contributions differently—and perhaps not based on
inventorship definitions in patent law. Second, students are likely to
capitulate to university and faculty demands (even if under protest) and
wait until after graduation to bring any lawsuit. Such actions by students
are highly indicative of the negotiation power imbalance between faculty
and non-faculty inventors. This Article thoroughly discusses the issues
that arise in technology transfer and invention disclosure. Even with
these ever-present issues, universities should not ignore the revenue
sharing requirements set forth in the Bayh-Dole Act and should
implement a revenue sharing policy and an accompanying dispute
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 10.
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resolution policy in order to ensure that licensing revenues are shared
equitably among the joint inventors.
This Article explores basic problems of the university technologytransfer process and its cumulative impact on revenue sharing and the
technology-transfer process as a whole. Part II overviews university
technology-transfer history and process, including a discussion of the
history and purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act and the role of technologytransfer offices. Part III recounts the problems with incentivizing
invention disclosure by university inventors as well as defining
inventorship and ownership under patent law, along with the associated
problems encountered by universities. Part IV discusses the Bayh-Dole
revenue sharing requirements and explains that the problems
encountered in Part III are similarly important in the revenue sharing
context before discussing possible revenue sharing policies for
universities.
II. UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OVERVIEW
University scientific research spans the gamut from basic research 27
to applications of technology ready for commercialization. What ties
much of this research together is a reliance on federal funding. The
reliance on federal funding led Congress to be concerned that taxpayers
were receiving fair returns on the research investments and to pass the
Bayh-Dole Act, which governs the intellectual property rights of
inventions created during the course of federally funded research. The
history and purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act is discussed in more detail in
Part II.A. The regulations and incentives of the Bayh-Dole Act in turn
led universities to create technology-transfer offices to handle the
intellectual property relating to those university inventions. Part II.B
focuses on technology-transfer offices and their roles in technology
transfer.
A. History of the Bayh-Dole Act
While patent rights generally exist to encourage invention and
enable disclosure to the public, 28 before 1980, federally funded
university research lacked the rewards for either inventors or
universities. Many funding agencies assumed that ownership of such
27. As used in this Article, basic scientific research is that research designed to improve
understanding of fundamental principles, relationships, and workings of the natural world. The main
goal of basic scientific research is understanding, rather than the creation of a commercial product.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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innovations belonged with the funding agency itself, 29 due to a lack of
uniform federal policy defining the ownership of innovations resulting
from federally funded research. 30 Therefore, researchers using federal
funds had no incentives to disclose created innovations other than in
publications that resulted in the dedication of the inventions to the
intellectual commons. Additionally, those inventions from basic research
that were patented tended to be vastly under-utilized. Of the
approximately 30,000 patents held by the United States Government,
only five percent were licensed out to private industry. 31 One goal of the
Bayh-Dole Act was to create incentives to drive the commercialization
of academic innovations. 32
The Bayh-Dole Act defines the uniform federal patent policy for
agencies that fund university research. One stated policy of the BayhDole Act is “to promote the utilization of inventions arising from
federally supported research or development.” 33 The Bayh-Dole Act
accomplishes this policy, in part, by giving universities the option to
take title to any invention created by federal funding 34 and to
commercialize those inventions through licensing. This process
incentivizes universities to commercialize inventions by allowing them
to collect licensing revenues. Recognizing that inventors would need
incentives to disclose their inventions to the universities, the Bayh-Dole
Act also required universities to share a portion of that licensing revenue
with the inventors. 35
The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 spurred acceleration of
university technology transfer. In 1980, there were approximately two
dozen technology-transfer offices (TTOs) at universities across the
United States; today, technology transfer has grown such that almost
29. See, e.g., Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th Century:
The World Before and After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL’Y 772, 776-77 (2006).
30. John E. Tyler III, Advancing University Innovation: More Must be Expected—More Must
be Done, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 143, 146 (2009).
31. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., MANAGING UNIVERSITY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 16 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza
eds., 2011).
32. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-29 (codified at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200-212). For a full description of the history leading up to the implementation of the
Bayh-Dole Act, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1671-95 (1996).
33. 35 U.S.C.A. § 200 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 11494, and 114-113) 2016).
34. 35 U.S.C.A. § 202(a) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 11494, and 114-113) 2016).
35. 35 U.S.C.A. § 202(c)(7)(B) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 11492, 114-94, and 114-113) 2016).
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every major research institution has a TTO.36 A 2009 Association of
University Technology Managers survey of 179 technology-transfer
offices reported 12,109 new patent applications were filed and over
5,300 licenses were granted. 37 Licensing revenues had grown to
approximately 2.3 billion dollars in 2009, as compared to about 1 billion
dollars of total licensing revenue in 2000. 38
B. Role of the Technology-Transfer Office
The increased numbers of patent applications and licenses reported
are due to the operation of the university technology-transfer process,
which begins well before the TTO becomes involved. The technologytransfer process begins with invention in the university research
laboratory. The large cast of the university research laboratory includes
faculty researchers, termed “Principal Investigators” who lead the
research group or laboratory, non-tenure track faculty research
associates, post-doctoral fellows, graduate students, and technicians. 39
Project funding leads to inventions that the academic researchers, as the
inventors, must disclose to the university’s TTO. Generally, the inventor
is required to fill out a disclosure form providing basic information
about the invention, relevant funding, and inventor identification. 40
Once the TTO receives the disclosure, it determines whether to
patent and license the invention based on market analysis and
patentability searches. 41 Upon determination that patent protection is
appropriate, the TTO begins the patent prosecution process and attempts
to license the invention. The TTO distributes revenues from the licenses
back to the university to fund further research and support other
university educational and administrative functions. Importantly, a
36. See Gideon D. Markman et al., Entrepreneurship From the Ivory Tower: Do Incentive
Systems Matter?, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 353, 353 (2004).
37. See ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY:
FY2009 25, 34 (Rich Kordal et al. eds., 2010).
38. Id. at 37.
39. For a fuller description of the research laboratory, see Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Unveiling
the Distinction Between the University and Its Academic Researchers: Lessons for Patent
Infringement and University Technology Transfer, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 473, 478-80
(2010).
40. There are two types of disclosure often mentioned in relation to university research: (1)
disclosure by the inventor to the university and (2) disclosure by the university to the relevant
governmental funding agency. For the purposes of this paper, “disclosure” will refer to disclosure
by the inventor of an invention to the university TTO.
41. See AUTM FY2008, supra note 2, at 21 (“Once the technology transfer office receives
the innovations in the form of disclosures, it assesses each disclosure for commercial potential,
novelty, potential for startup opportunity, and pre-existing obligations.”).
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portion of the licensing revenue is distributed to the inventors as
incentives to encourage invention and invention disclosure to the
university. 42
III. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROBLEMS GENERALLY
At least three related problem points should be highlighted in the
technology-transfer process. Invention disclosure is an important
requirement in order to begin the process, but without university
researcher support, no such disclosures occur. Once disclosed, university
researchers must identify the inventors for patent procurement.
Unfortunately, inventor identification is an area that is more difficult
than it first appears. Finally, in order to distribute licensing revenue, the
relative proportion of inventorship, a mutual agreement among the
inventors, or some other method must be employed to determine revenue
allocation among inventors. This allocation mechanism is a little
researched area of technology-transfer, but is fraught with many of the
same difficulties as the first two areas.
Therefore, in order to understand the issues raised by revenue
allocation, it is also helpful to review the literature associated with the
first two problems. Part III.A fully discusses the issues with
incentivizing invention disclosure and outlines the incentives and
disincentives of invention disclosure in Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2,
respectively. Part III.B discusses the issues involved in defining
inventorship, including a discussion of patent ownership and who an
inventor actually is in Part III.B.1 and a discussion of inventorship issues
specifically in the university setting in Part III.B.2.
A. Problem One: Incentivizing Invention Disclosure
Much has been written about inventor disclosure in the university
technology-transfer process. The underlying basis of the university
technology-transfer system relies on inventor researchers to disclose
patentable and licensable innovations—otherwise the innovations are
generally published in scientific journals and thus dedicated to the public
domain. However, faculty support of the technology-transfer process has
lagged behind university investment for myriad reasons.
42. The Bayh-Dole Act requires non-profit organizations such as universities to share with
the inventors some portion of the royalties obtained by the licensing of federally funded inventions.
35 U.S.C. § 202 (c)(7)(B) requires that funding agreements include as provisions “a requirement
that the contractor share royalties with the inventor.” 35 U.S.C.A. § 202(c)(7)(B) (West, Westlaw
through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 114-94, and 114-113) 2016).
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In support of the technology-transfer system, most university
policies include a duty to disclose and to assign title to inventions, and
universities require researchers to agree to these policies as a term of
employment—including employment as student research assistants. 43
Non-employee researchers, such as graduate students and sometimes
even undergraduate students, are generally subject to similar policies in
which the university claims title to any inventions developed using
university resources. 44
Despite a contractual duty to disclose and the possibility of
monetary revenue, as many as 50% of patentable innovations are not
disclosed by researchers to their university’s TTO. 45 Such disregard for
the duty to disclose suggests an imbalance between incentives to
disclose and other influences on researchers. The disclosure incentive is
generally monetary—a slice of the licensing revenues, as is required by
the Bayh-Dole Act for federally funded inventions. 46 On the other hand,
incentives to ignore disclosure requirements are varied and include
social norms, time-management issues, and a lack of education about the
duty and the monetary incentives.
1. Disclosure Incentives
University intellectual property policies generally provide for
43. See, e.g., The University of Michigan Technology Transfer Policy, THE UNIVERSITY OF
MICHIGAN (June 1, 2009), http://www.techtransfer.umich.edu/resources/policies.php; James D.
Clements, Improving Bayh-Dole: A Case for Inventor Ownership of Federally Sponsored Research
Patents, 49 IDEA 469, 500-01 (2009).
44. There is debate as to the ability of the university to claim ownership of student-created
inventions in certain contexts, such as inventions created during a class. This Article is limited to
inventorship in the context of a university research laboratory, which typically means that the
student is also acting, in many ways, as an employee of the university and using substantial
university resources. For more information on the debate, see Sean B. Seymore, My Patent, Your
Patent, or Our Patent? Inventorship Disputes Within Academic Research Groups, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI.
& TECH. 125, 137 (2006); and Anthony J. Luppino, Fixing a Hole: Eliminating Ownership
Uncertainties to Facilitate University-Generated Innovation, 78 UMKC L. REV. 367, 377-78, 38384 (2009).
45. See Richard A. Jensen, Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Disclosure and Licensing
of University Inventions: ‘The Best We Can Do with the S**t We Get to Work With’, 21 INT’L J.
INDUS. ORG. 1271, 1272 (2003); Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Pros and Cons of Faculty
Participation in Licensing, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH) 187, 189 (Gary D. Libecap ed.,
2005) [hereinafter Thursby, Pros and Cons]; Albert N. Link, Donald S. Siegel & Barry Bozeman,
An Empirical Analysis of the Propensity of Academics to Engage in Informal University Technology
Transfer, 16 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 641, 642-43 (2007).
46. See generally 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 200-204 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding
P.L. 114-92, 114-94, and 114-113) 2016).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 2

656

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[49:647

inventors, both faculty and non-faculty, to receive a share of the
licensing revenue derived from their invention as an incentive for
disclosure. The average distribution of revenue to the inventors is a 40%
share of the net licensing revenue. 47 However, the policies differ greatly
on the percentage awarded to each party and whether those percentages
are stable or variable according to the amount of licensing revenue
generated by the invention. 48
Some scholars have suggested that monetary incentives are less
effective than other types of incentives in the academic research world.
These scholars suggest that academic researchers are more interested in
the secure employment of tenure, intellectual freedom, and recognition
of their peers. 49 While these non-monetary goals and interests are
dependent on grant funding for research and a stream of publications,
they are not inconsistent with monetary incentives. Indeed, many
scholars have used empirical methods to model the effect of
incentivization of faculty researchers through share of licensing revenue.
In general, these studies conclude that monetary incentives have at least
some positive impact on disclosures. 50 However, some studies have
shown little or no positive impact of revenue sharing with researchers. It
is likely that faculty response to monetary incentives varies across
institutions based on the strength of the competing disincentives to
disclose.

47. Thursby, Objectives, supra note 3, at 61.
48. For a detailed description of two major university revenue sharing policies, see generally
Carter-Johnson, supra note 5.
49. DANIEL S. GREENBERG, SCIENCE FOR SALE: THE PERILS, REWARDS AND DELUSIONS OF
CAMPUS CAPITALISM 22-23 (2007). See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven
Research and University Technology Transfer, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (ADVANCES IN THE
STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH) 93, 99-104 (Gary D.
Libecap ed., 2005).
50. See, e.g., Donald S. Siegel, David Waldman & Albert Link, Assessing the Impact of
Organizational Practices on the Relative Productivity of University Technology Transfer Offices:
An Exploratory Study, 32 RES. POL’Y 27, 44-45 (2003); Joseph Friedman & Jonathan Silberman,
University Technology Transfer: Do Incentives, Management and Location Matter?, 28 J. TECH.
TRANSFER 17, 29 (2003) (showing a positive but weak correlation of license revenue share
incentives to faculty researchers with the number of licenses executed, and a strong correlation with
license income. This discrepancy may be due to a skewing of the data by one or more “blockbuster”
inventions or could also be due to limits on TTO resources to execute more licenses.); Albert N.
Link & Donald S. Siegel, Generating Science-Based Growth: An Economic Analysis of the Impact
of Organizational Incentives on University-Industry Technology Transfer, 11 EUR. J. FIN. 169, 179
(2005); Thursby, Pros and Cons, supra note 45, at 192; Saul Lach & Mark Schankerman, Incentives
and Invention in Universities, 39 RAND J. ECON. 403, 404 (2008) (showing that license revenue
sharing with scientists strongly affects licensing outcomes).
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2. Disincentives to Disclosure
Arrayed against these monetary incentives to disclose are a number
of pressures inherent in the academic research environment. Social
norms, lack of education, and a perception that time is better spent
elsewhere all work together to offset the potential monetary incentive to
disclose. 51
University scientists work in a community that was built on the free
sharing of ideas through publications, conferences, and open discussion.
The social norms surrounding this community have made it difficult to
convince university scientists that participating in the technologytransfer process is valuable as many of these norms conflict with
technology transfer. 52 For example, patents result in exclusivity rights
which restrict use of an invention. Publication may also be delayed to
file a patent. While current U.S. patent law allows a one year grace
period after research publication but before patent application, 53 the
patent laws of many other countries have an absolute publication bar
upon any publication of the innovation before the patent application. 54
Therefore, academic researchers may fear that disclosure of innovations
to the university TTO will result in requirements to delay publication or
conference presentations so that patent applications can be timely filed. 55
Additionally, scientists often lack education about patent law and
51. For a full discussion of the disincentives to disclose, see generally Carter-Johnson, supra
note 5.
52. See, e.g., Thursby, Pros and Cons, supra note 45, at 189 (“[S]ome faculty may refuse to
disclose for ‘philosophical’ reasons related to their notions of the proper role of academic scientists
and engineers.”); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999) (discussing changes in scientific norms
within the biotechnology research community); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 289-90 (2003)
(discussing the erosion of ‘open science’ norms resulting at least in part from the encouragement of
university patenting of basic biomedical research). For a comprehensive discussion of the debate
over the existence and effects on scientific norms on technology transfer, see generally Charles R.
McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and Development:
Evaluating the Arguments and Empirical Research to Date, in PERSPECTIVES ON
COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2012).
53. 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92,
114-94, and 114-113) 2016).
54. See generally Certain Aspects of National/Regional Patent Laws: Grace Period, WIPO
(Nov.
2015),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/scp/en/national_laws/grace_period.pdf
(describing grace periods for publication, or the lack of the same, in Europe and other countries).
55. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Policy, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS, (Oct. 1,
2014),
https://wustl.edu/about/compliance-policies/intellectual-property-research-policies/
intellectual-property/ (“The publication of research results must not be hampered by agreements
made to commercialize intellectual property. However, a minimal and defined delay to protect
intellectual property through patent applications may be included.”).
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technology transfer generally. Scientists may lack knowledge about the
legal definition of an invention or inventorship as well the steps required
to disclose an invention to the TTO. Academic researchers do not
instinctively understand when a patentable invention has been created or
even recognize the existence of the duty to disclose an invention. To the
extent that the time pressures discussed below exist, academic
researchers are unlikely to find time to educate themselves if they lack
an underlying understanding of the importance of technology transfer.
Finally, aside from social norms and technology-transfer education,
the simple balancing of the time investment necessary for disclosure and
the expectations of recoupment may weigh against disclosure. For many
academic researchers, this balancing of time commitments may weigh
strongly in favor of failing to disclose. Once a faculty researcher creates
a new technology, she must determine the best use of the technology and
her time in order to continue to receive more funding and job stability
such as tenure. Monetary gain in the distant future may not outweigh a
publication or further grant writing. 56 Similarly, post-doctoral
researchers and graduate students must make a trade-off between
publication and its concomitant career advancement and the time needed
for disclosure. 57
B. Problem Two: Determining Inventorship
Once the university researchers have made the decision to disclose,
the next hurdle in the technology-transfer process is to determine who
should be a named inventor on the patent. As noted above, lack of
education in this process may indeed be a disincentive for disclosure in
the first place. Perhaps more importantly, lack of education combined
with inherent biases in the research community may result in the
omission of inventors from a patent application.
1. Defining Inventorship
To understand the problems with invention determination in the
university technology-transfer process, it is important to understand
inventorship and the underlying patent laws. Under U.S. patent law,

56. Daniel W. Elfenbein, Publications, Patents, and the Market for University Inventions, 63
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 688, 689 (2007); Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 45, at 1272.
57. For a full discussion of why non-faculty researchers are unlikely to be incentivized by the
technology-transfer system and suggestions to include them in the process, see generally CarterJohnson, supra note 5 and Luppino, supra note 44.
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ownership of a patent initially vests in the inventor. 58 The Federal
Circuit has used strong language to make that point, holding that by
default, “an invention presumptively belongs to its creator” 59 and that
inventor ownership is a “bedrock tenet of patent law.” 60 Therefore, the
naming of the inventor on a patent defines ownership of the patent as
well as who needs to transfer the rights of the patented technologies to
the university for licensing. 61
In Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., the Federal Circuit
explained that conception of the invention is what determines
inventorship. 62 The Federal Circuit held that “[c]onception is the
formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea
of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in
practice.” 63
Conception does not need to be one person, but rather, multiple
people can qualify as inventor. Joint inventorship has been defined as
“the product of a collaboration between two or more persons working
together to solve the problem addressed.” 64 However, it is not always
easy to determine if two researchers are joint inventors. Multiple
researchers can be joint inventors on a patent even if “(1) they did not
physically work together or at the same time, (2) each did not make the
same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not make a
contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the patent.” 65 Each
person only has to perform “part of the task which produces the
invention,” 66 but one cannot be considered a joint inventor if they

58. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 11494, and 114-113) 2016). See generally DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2.01 (1978).
59. Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
60. Isr. Bio-Eng’g Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d 1256, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
61. Previously only the inventor could file a patent application. However, section 4 of the
America Invents Act provides that applications filed after September 16, 2012 may be filed by the
inventor, the inventor’s assignee, or anyone to whom the inventor is obliged to assign the patent,
even if the assignment has not yet been executed. Donald S. Chisum, America Invents Act of 2011:
Analysis and Cross-References, CHISUM PATENT ACADEMY 41-42 (Dec. 5, 2011), available at
www.chisum.com/wp-content/uploads/AIAOverview.pdf. For an overview of problems in
conception and inventorship, see Aaron X. Fellmeth, Conception and Misconception in Joint
Inventorship, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 73 (2012).
62. 135 F.3d 1456, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
63. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d. 1223,
1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Conception is the touchstone of inventorship . . . .”).
64. Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d. at 1227.
65. 35 U.S.C.A. § 116(a) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 11494, and 114-113) 2016).
66. Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460.
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merely assisted the inventor after conception or provided the inventor
with basic principles and explanations of the art. 67
A patent usually contains multiple claims, each relating to a
different aspect of the invention. Therefore, a patented invention can be,
and often is, attributed to several inventors, each of which must have
contributed conceptually to at least one of the claims in the patent.68
Additionally, since the conceived invention changes over time, initial
conception is often not an indication of all of the inventors. 69
Failure to denote an inventor can be quite serious, though recent
changes have made omissions less problematic. Before the passing of §
256 of the Patent Act in 1952, all errors regarding the addition or
removal of an inventor caused the patent to be invalid. 70 Passage of §
256 allowed for changes to the listed inventors. 71 Under § 256, removing
an inventor from an issued patent could be accomplished with no regard
as to how that person became named in the first place. 72 However, to add
an inventor to an issued patent, no deceptive intent on the part of the
non-named inventor was allowed. 73 Most recently, the passage of the
America Invents Act (AIA) significantly altered the language of § 256.74
The requirement that the error arise without deceptive intent was
removed. 75 This strongly increases the rights of patentees because they
67. Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415-16 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Hess v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys. Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
68. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 116(a) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92,
114-94, and 114-113) 2016); Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1548 (“[E]ach joint inventor must generally
contribute to the conception of the invention.”).
69. For a full discussion of how to determine patent inventorship, see generally Christopher
McDavid, I Want a Piece of That! How the Current Joint Inventorship Laws Deal with Minor
Contributions to Inventions, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 449 (2010).
70. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc., v. Sperry Rand Corp., 444 F.2d 406, 408 (4th
Cir. 1971).
71. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, § 256, 66 Stat. 792, 810 (1952) (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 256).
72. Patent Act of 1952 § 256.
73. The actual language of § 256 makes this clear:
Whenever through error a person is named in an issued patent as the inventor, or through
error an inventor is not named in an issued patent and such error arose without any deceptive intention on his part, the Director may, on application of all the parties and assignees, with proof of the facts and such other requirements as may be imposed, issued a
certificate correcting such error.
Patent Act of 1952 of § 256 (emphasis added).
74. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 20, 125 Stat. 284, 334 (2011)
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 256); Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1481.02: Correction of
Named Inventor, THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s1481.html.
75. 35 U.S.C.A § 256 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 114-94,
and 114-113) 2016).
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no longer have to defend accusations of deceptive behavior when
attempting to cure the inventorship defects in a patent.
2. Importance of Inventorship to Universities
While ownership of a patent initially vests with an inventor or joint
inventors, the Bayh-Dole Act gives universities the right to “elect to
retain title to any subject invention.” 76 Until recently, many assumed that
this provision implied automatic vesting of ownership of federally
funded inventions to the university rather than through assignment by
the inventor. 77 This assumption was rejected recently in Stanford v.
Roche. 78
In Roche, Mark Holodniy, hired as a research fellow at Stanford
University, had signed Stanford’s “Copyright and Patent Agreement”
obligating him to assign any inventions and related intellectual property
to Stanford University. 79 He later signed a “Visitor’s Confidentiality
Agreement” with Cetus [Roche] that provided that Holodniy “do[es]
hereby assign to Cetus” the “right, title and interest in each of the ideas,
inventions and improvements” that he developed during his work at
Cetus—including the PCR-based HIV detection assay he later
developed. 80
Years later, Stanford sued Roche for patent infringement based on
the Holodniy patents. 81 Roche countered that Stanford did not own the
patents because Holodniy’s Visitor’s Confidentiality Agreement
contained an assignment of the PCR-based invention because the assay
was based on technology that Holodniy learned while at Cetus. 82 The
Federal Circuit agreed with Roche, noting that Stanford’s prior
Copyright and Patent Agreement merely held a contractual obligation to
assign rather than an actual assignment. 83 Holodniy may have breached
76. 35 U.S.C.A. § 202(a) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 11494, and 114-113) 2016).
77. See, e.g., Friedman & Silberman, supra note 50, at 18 (“The Bayh-Dole act requires
university’s faculty members, students or staff members who recognize or discover a new
technology or invention that has commercialization potential to disclose the invention to their
institution’s Technology Transfer Ofﬁce (TTO).”).
78. Bd. of Tr. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2199 (2011).
79. Id. at 2192.
80. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. at 2193.
82. Id.
83. See Bd. of Tr. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583
F.3d 832, 841-42 (Fed. Cir. 2009). This issue was not reviewed by the Supreme Court. See Leland
Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2194.
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his contractual obligation to Stanford, but the first assignment of the
technology went to Cetus. The Supreme Court held that the source of
funding did not affect ownership of the resulting patent and that even
though the PCR assay was developed with federal funding under the
Bayh-Dole Act, ownership rights continued to vest initially with the
inventor. 84 Therefore, because Holodniy first assigned his patent rights
to Cetus, he had no rights left to assign to Stanford. As a result of this
holding, universities must acquire a valid patent assignment agreement
in order to have the authority to transfer ownership rights.
In light of the Roche decision, patent rights initially vest in
inventors—even those using federal funds to invent. Therefore,
universities must rely on inventors to assign patent applications and
assignments. Without inventor cooperation, the university cannot
procure the needed patents or oversee the licensing of technologies
created within its walls. 85
It can be difficult for a scientific researcher to determine who
should be included as an inventor. Problems in the technology-transfer
process may arise due to ambiguities in inventorship. Due to the
definition of inventorship and the complexities of the modern university
research environment, inventions often include conceptual and creative
contributions by many people building on an initial idea. Unfortunately,
universities often leave the determination of inventorship, especially
during the disclosure stage, to the researchers themselves. Because these
researchers lack patent law training, their designation of joint inventors
may be legally incorrect, resulting in improper patent prosecution and
assignments. If the TTO fails to list a joint inventor on a patent and get
an assignment, that joint inventor may later sue to claim her patent rights
and potentially license those rights in competition with the university.
Problems associated with the failure to list an inventor can be
exacerbated because it is not uncommon for faculty researchers to deny
that non-faculty members, particularly graduate and undergraduate
students, are inventors. Some faculty researchers have blatantly made
declarations to the United States Patent and Trademark Office declaring
themselves the sole inventor despite several graduate student and postdoctoral researcher co-authors on the very papers at the base of the
innovation 86 or declaring that all innovative work in the lab came from
84. Leland Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2195-99.
85. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 202(a), 202(c) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L.
114-92, 114-94, and 114-113) 2016).
86. See Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Seymore, supra note
44, at 147.
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faculty. 87 Even legal scholars look to faculty inventors suggesting that
the requirement that graduate students have faculty advisors for research
topics implies a lack of conceptual creativity on the part of those
students. 88
This attitude of many faculty inventors causes real problems. For
example in Chou v. University of Chicago, Joany Chou’s faculty advisor
failed to name her as an inventor on a patent and fired her when she
pressed her claim for inventorship. 89 After leaving the laboratory, Dr.
Chou sued her faculty advisor, the University of Chicago, and ARCH
Development Corporation, the University of Chicago’s licensing arm,
for correction of inventorship in order to have her name added to the
patent as a joint inventor so that she could receive a portion of the
licensing revenue. 90 On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that Dr.
Roizman had a fiduciary duty to his student with regards to giving her
credit as joint inventor on the patent application. 91
These sorts of problems between faculty and non-faculty inventors
can be viewed as power imbalances that affect the ability of the nonfaculty inventor to negotiate inventorship credit and a share of the
licensing revenue. 92 In negotiations between faculty researchers and
those non-faculty researchers working in their laboratories, this power
imbalance is often exacerbated. More so than in many employment
situations, the faculty researcher holds a great deal of power over the
future career prospects of post-doctoral fellows and students in their
laboratories. Due to the apprentice-like structure of graduate science
programs, the faculty member controls degree prospects of students and
publishing abilities of both students and post-doctoral fellows. For the
non-faculty researcher, this relationship makes bargaining for
inventorship credit and splits of revenue problematic as the faulty
member has a great amount of perceived power over the non-faculty
researcher. This extreme perceived power imbalance may result in the
87. CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC WORK? BATTLING FOR CONTROL OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 183 (2001) (quoting a faculty researcher describing inventorship in his
laboratory: “I think there’s rarely more than one inventor . . . if you wake up and you have an idea,
that’s the invention . . . . The postdoctoral researchers contributed to the work [around the idea], but
they didn’t do any really innovative work such as contributing new concepts, [or] coming up with
something that, in my lab, I haven’t thought about.”).
88. See, e.g., Clements, supra note 43, at 497 (suggesting that graduate students need receive
no incentives to invent beyond their yearly stipend, perhaps due to the idea that faculty members are
the true inventors within the laboratory).
89. 254 F.3d at 1353-54.
90. Id. at 1354.
91. Id. at 1362-63.
92. Carter-Johnson, supra note 5, at 676.
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avoidance of conflict and lack of disclosure by non-faculty researchers. 93
IV. REVENUE SHARING ALLOCATIONS IN UNIVERSITIES
Once an invention is disclosed to a university, the inventorship
issues are resolved, and a patent is issued to the university, the invention
may be licensed for commercialization. Revenue from licensing the
patent must be shared with the inventors in order to comply with the
Bayh-Dole Act. In order to distribute licensing revenue, the relative
proportion of inventorship, a mutual agreement among the inventors, or
some other method must be employed to determine revenue allocation
among inventors. This allocation mechanism is a little-researched area of
technology transfer. Part IV.A reviews the revenue sharing requirements
of the Bayh-Dole Act and how the competing interests of inventors can
affect the revenue sharing. Finally, Part IV.B suggests revenue sharing
policies that universities can implement in an attempt to curb revenue
sharing issues among inventors.
A. Problem Three: Determining Revenue Sharing Allocations
After disclosure and licensing, fortunate universities and inventors
will receive revenue based on the patented inventions. These revenues
are shared amongst all named inventors on the patent due to Bayh-Dole
Act requirements. However, the Bayh-Dole Act does not specify how to
allocate the revenues between joint inventors. Technology-transfer
policies and negotiations between joint inventors determine the
allocation but raise many of the same issues seen with disclosure and
inventorship determinations discussed above.
1. Revenue Sharing Requirements
As described above, the Bayh-Dole Act requires universities to
share proceeds from the licensing of patents with the inventor. 94
However, neither the Bayh-Dole Act nor its implementing regulations
define how such revenue must be shared with any given inventor even
though the Code of Federal Regulations specifically recognizes that coinventors exist by including reference to federal employee co-inventors
in the revenue sharing requirements. 95 Since many university patents
93. Id.
94. 35 U.S.C.A. § 202(c)(7)(B) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 11492, 114-94, and 114-113) 2016).
95. 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(k)(2) (2016) states that “[t]he contractor will share royalties collected
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have multiple named joint inventors, this revenue sharing requirement
necessitates that the university and/or inventors determine an allocation
mechanism for revenue amongst multiple competing interests.
University technology-transfer policies typically set out the portion
of the revenue for the inventors as a group. 96 These policies may also set
out the mechanism for revenue allocation amongst the inventors. For
example, from our Charest example in the Introduction, 97 Harvard’s
policy required all joint inventors to agree to a revenue sharing
agreement or default to an equal division of the royalties. 98
As in Charest, problems may arise when universities ignore the
stated policy. For instance, both Harvard and the Principal Investigator
(PI) believed that the PI should have 50% of the royalties leaving the
other four non-faculty joint inventors to share the remaining 50%. 99
When Charest disagreed, preferring the default 20% division, Harvard
stepped in and pushed for the agreement in spite of its policy to the
contrary. 100
Thus, university technology-transfer policies, while almost
completely discretionary, need to be a statement of the true university
policy. These policies should address the competing interests of the
various parties to the technology-transfer process, recognizing that all
inventors are not a monolithic group. 101
2. Competing Interests and Attitudes
To understand the best way to allocate revenue among joint
inventors, it is important to understand the attitudes and interests of the
various parties. Joint inventors may be any combination of laboratory
members described above—faculty members, graduate students, postdoctoral fellows, to name a few. Many of the issues described in the
technology-transfer problem points above also permeate the discussion
of revenue allocation.
The monetary incentives geared toward disclosure are more
immediate when discussing revenue allocation. An individual inventor

on a subject invention with the inventor, including Federal employee co-inventors” (emphasis
added) but does not specify how those royalties should be divided.
96. Thursby, Objectives, supra note 3, at 61.
97. See supra notes 6-26 and accompanying text.
98. Complaint at 8, Charest v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. & Andrew G. Myers,
2016 WL 614368 (D. Mass. Feb. 16, 2016) (No. 1:13-cv-11556).
99. Id. at 8-9.
100. Id.
101. Carter-Johnson, supra note 5, at 670.
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trying to determine her fair revenue allocation based upon her
contribution would likely have immediate monetary incentive to assess
her contribution. However, as in the disclosure context, the monetary
incentives may not offset other pressures on an individual to minimize
her contribution.
For example, a graduate student who is a joint inventor with her PI
is likely to face several pressures to minimize her revenue allocation
similar to the battles fought for recognition of inventor status. Unlike
inventorship, there are no legal rules requiring any particular revenue
allocation for a named inventor. Fairness and equity are the best
arguments for sharing revenue above a minimum amount.
Unfortunately, equitable distribution may be a difficult argument if
the faculty inventor has trouble believing the graduate student is a joint
inventor. As discussed above, university researchers are not educated as
to the rules concerning inventorship. This lack of education may result in
overestimation of some contributions to the invention with concomitant
underestimation of other contributions. Due to a lack of education, these
mis-estimations are likely exacerbated by claim amendments during
prosecution that narrow the scope of the disclosed invention.
Additionally, many faculty members may have a hard time believing
that graduate students contribute inventive ideas. This attitude further
diminishes any estimated allocation due to the graduate student.
Negotiating a revenue allocation under those circumstances can be
quite difficult when views of contribution are not matched. Making the
revenue allocation agreement more difficult is the negotiation power
imbalance that exists between the faculty and non-faculty inventors. 102
Even an immediate monetary incentive is unlikely to overcome a
graduate student’s reluctance to anger her PI when project assignments
and future recommendations are more valuable in the long term.
With these competing interests and power imbalances in mind,
universities must determine how to equitably define a distribution of
revenue amongst the joint inventors. However, due to the lack of
guidance from the Bayh-Dole Act, the definition of equitable could have
different meanings to each university.
B. Defining an “Equitable” Revenue Distribution
To be clear, neither the Bayh-Dole Act nor the CFR requires an
“equitable” sharing among joint inventors, merely that the revenue be

102.

Id. at 676.
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shared with them. It might be argued that a token amount of money
could be given to a joint inventor, but this would seem to call into
question the spirit of the statutory requirement, if not the specific
language. More problematically, there could well be different views as
to what constitutes an equitable revenue distribution among joint
inventors. University policies could differ widely and still be considered
equitable based on a number of factors.
The first potential revenue distribution policy would be to share the
inventor portion of the revenue equally amongst all named joint
inventors on a patent. Such a policy mirrors aligning the revenue sharing
with the initial patent ownership since all joint inventors are considered
to be equal owners of the patent. However, an equal revenue sharing
policy does not reflect the underlying work that goes into inventorship.
To be a joint inventor, and thus joint owner of a patent, one must
contribute to at least one claim of a patent. Under an equal sharing
policy, a joint inventor might then contribute a minor component of the
invention but receive as much money from the patent licensing as the
main invention developer. Additionally, the revenue sharing policy of
the Bayh-Dole Act has been theorized to be about invention disclosure
rather than pure compensation for assignment of the patent ownership. 103
University employees are required to assign patent rights as part of their
terms of employment; therefore, the necessity of paying each joint
inventor equally to compensate for ownership rights is abrogated.
A second distribution sharing policy for revenue distribution would
be based on inventive input. Under an inventive input policy, university
TTOs or joint inventors would determine how much each inventor
contributed to the final invention and distribute revenue based on that
contribution. This policy reflects the work that each inventor contributes
and ignores the equal ownership issues described above. Difficulties
may arise under this policy due to a lack of understanding regarding
what an inventive step actually entails as described above. Additionally,
conception does not equate to the amount of hands on work that an
individual may have contributed to the project resulting in the
invention—making understanding of the revenue distribution harder for
the joint inventors to understand. Furthermore, due to the nature of the
patent prosecution process, patent application amendments may change
the relative inventive input over the course of the application process. A
103. See, e.g., Martin Kenney & Donald Patton, Reconsidering the Bayh-Dole Act and the
Current University Invention Ownership Model, 38 RES. POL’Y 1407, 1413 (2009) (“The literature
suggests that the best way to encourage disclosure on the part of university employees is to increase
their share of the invention’s income.”).
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joint inventor at disclosure may no longer be a named inventor once the
patent issues if her contribution is deemed unpatentable. These
difficulties can be alleviated with an increased emphasis on education by
the TTO.
A third revenue distribution policy would be for the joint inventors
to decide the split amongst themselves. The advantage of this policy is
that it allows the inventors the autonomy to determine what they believe
to be an equitable distribution. However, this autonomy is also the
failing of this policy. As noted above, the lack of education as to what is
an inventive contribution will be exacerbated by the negotiation power
imbalance inherent in the laboratory structure. Additionally, the
problems associated with the second policy will also exist but without an
incentive for the TTO to lead an educational effort.
A final major revenue distribution policy option would be to give a
set minimum percentage to the PI of the laboratory when she is an
inventor in recognition of the underlying contribution that the PI makes
to all work that occurs in the laboratory. A university could well decide
that the PI should receive a minimum of a fifty percent revenue share
because the PI leads the funding efforts of the laboratory as well as the
mentorship of members of the laboratory. This approach recognizes that
one of the underlying motivations for the revenue sharing provision is
disclosure. Having a PI who is invested in the technology-transfer
system increases the odds of disclosure over the long term because the
other members of the laboratory are likely to leave the university after a
few years. However, if the invention is developed primarily by other
members of the laboratory, those members are likely to feel the revenue
sharing is not entirely equitable.
Therefore, this approach would require extensive initial amounts of
education by the TTO to explain why the PI received a large automatic
share. The policy would also need to be supplemented by a secondary
policy as described above in order to determine how the remaining
revenue should be distributed. However, allocating a large share directly
to the PI may result in less pressure by the PI on the other joint inventors
during negotiations as the PI will have received her (perceived earned)
large share. This policy may reflect ownership or inventorship in the
secondary policy depending on the university’s decisions.
There are numerous variations on these basic revenue distribution
policies. The timing of the joint inventor determination may be made at
various points in the process from disclosure to licensing to patent
issuance. The entity making the determination of inventorship
percentage could be joint inventors, the TTO, an independent patent
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attorney or a separate standing committee. The university might also
give weight to license agreement in determining the revenue distribution
amongst joint inventors. If a relatively minor portion of the invention is
the driving force behind a license negotiation, that inventor could
receive a relatively larger portion of the proceeds than the base policy
might allow. Each of these variations will have benefits and drawbacks
that each university will have to weigh in light of its own process. These
policies do generally require significant input from the TTO.
Additionally, each of these policies may result in the joint inventors
disagreeing with the revenue allocation outcome. Some policies may
result from disagreement amongst inventors while others may result
from an inventor doubting the determination of a non-inventor arbiter. In
any case, the university should have a dispute resolution policy in place
for such disagreement. The method of the process will vary based on the
type of the initial policy and is beyond the scope of this Article.
One revenue distribution policy that no university should ever
adopt is to ignore the contributions of non-faculty inventors. The BayhDole Act does not distinguish different types of joint inventors 104 and
requires that all inventors receive a portion of the revenues from
licensing the patent. Therefore, universities should carefully consider
both revenue distribution policies that include all joint inventors as well
as educational programs that allow those policies the greatest chance of
working.
V. CONCLUSION
The issues that arise early in the technology-transfer process that
impact disclosure and inventor determination become important again
later in the process. After licensing, revenue allocation requires
university technology-transfer offices to confront many of the same
issues that caused problems throughout the process.
University policies may not be aligned with the goals and interests
of all parties. Harvard’s policy required all joint inventors to agree to a
revenue sharing agreement or default to an equal division of the
royalties. It is unlikely that all inventors contribute equally to an
invention or that faculty inventors perceive the non-faculty contributions
as being substantial. These attitudes combined with a negotiation power
imbalance in favor of the favor inventors leaves many graduate students
with little to do other than agree with the PI.
104. Except the CFR does distinguish federal employee joint inventors. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. §
401.14(k)(2) (2016).
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There are many options for revenue distribution policies amongst
joint inventors. More research into university technology-transfer
policies with regards to revenue sharing allocations and dispute
resolutions is required in order for universities to mindfully execute this
stage of the technology-transfer process.
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